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Introduction
Bernard	Williams’s	last	book,	Truth and Truthfulness,	left	posterity	much	
to	puzzle	over.	Here	is	the	arch-critic	of	utilitarianism	seeking	to	vin-
dicate	 the	 intrinsic	 value	of	 truth	 in	 terms	of	 its	 instrumental	 value,	
thereby	 entrenching	 himself	 squarely	 in	 the	 traditional	 territory	 of	
indirect	utilitarianism.	What	is	more,	he	proposes	to	do	so	using	the	
method	of	genealogy,	which	suggests	a	historical	approach	—	but	he	
also	denies	 that	 the	concept	of	 truth	has	a	history,	and	prefaces	his	
historical	 remarks	 with	 an	 avowedly	 fictional	 state-of-nature	 story.	
Unsurprisingly,	 this	has	 raised	questions.	What	 separates	Williams’s	
instrumental	 vindication	 from	 indirect	utilitarianism?1	And	how	can	
genealogy	 vindicate	 anything,	 let	 alone	 something	 which	 does	 not	
have	 a	 history?2	 These	 questions	—	and	 Truth and Truthfulness as	 a	
whole	—	have	not	received	the	attention	they	deserve.	One	reason	for	
this	may	be	that	the	book	was	untimely.	Upon	its	appearance	in	2002,	
it	seemed	ostensibly	directed	against	over-enthusiastic	forms	of	post-
modernism	which	 soon	 appeared	 to	be	 already	on	 the	wane.	But	 a	
decade	and	a	half	later,	the	advent	of	“post-truth”	politics	vindicated	
Williams’s	 sense	 that	 the	value	of	 truth	needed	defending.	And	 this	
rich	exploration	of	the	point	of	valuing	the	truth	anyway	rewards	en-
gagement	with	the	puzzles	it	raises.
My	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	resolve	some	of	these	puzzles	in	order	
to	develop	an	understanding	of	Williams’s	genealogical	method	that	
reveals	it	to	be	uniquely	suited	to	dealing	with	what	I	call	self-effacing 
1.	 McGinn	(2003).
2.	 Nagel	 (2009,	 134)	 expresses	 puzzlement	 over	 the	 project	 of	 vindicating	
through	genealogy.	Koopman	(2013,	20,	64–5,	74,	87)	even	charges	Williams	
with	committing	 the	genetic	 fallacy.	McGinn	(2003)	finds	 the	genealogical	
story	 redundant,	 given	 that	 instrumental	 considerations	 are	 supposed	 to	
vindicate.	Rorty	(2002)	confesses	himself	unable	to	see	the	relation	between	
the	fictional	and	the	historical	parts	of	the	book.	In	general,	what	exactly	the	
book’s	 “circuitous”	 (Elgin	2005,	343)	argument	 is	 supposed	 to	be	has	been	
contested.	 Reactions	 have	 ranged	 from	 hailing	 it	 as	 “the	most	 interesting	
set	of	 reflections	on	 the	values	of	 truth	and	 truth-telling	 in	 living	memory”	
(Hacking	 2004,	 137)	 to	 questioning	whether	 the	 book	 is	more	 than	 “a	 col-
lection	of	loosely	related	essays	on	truth”	(Fleischacker	2004,	382).	The	first	
monograph	on	Williams	calls	it	“a	collection	of	interesting	intellectual	tribu-
taries	feeding	a	somewhat	elusive	main	channel”	(Jenkins	2006,	163).
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understood	as	continuing	the	pragmatist	tradition	that	has	been	called	
“Cambridge	pragmatism”,	and	 I	delineate	how	 the	state-of-nature	fic-
tion	relates	to	historical	considerations.	In	§3,	using	three	challenges	
raised	by	Colin	McGinn	as	a	 foil,	 I	 show	 in	what	 sense	an	 intrinsic	
value	 can	 be	 vindicated	 through	 pragmatic	 genealogy.	 I	 distinguish	
this	 type	of	vindication	from	indirect	utilitarianism,	and	I	argue	that	
Williams	 is	 concerned	with	a	 form	of	 self-effacing	 functionality	 that	
genealogy	 is	uniquely	 suited	 to	dealing	with.	 I	 conclude	with	an	as-
sessment	of	the	wider	significance	of	Williams’s	genealogy	both	for	his	
own	oeuvre	and	for	further	genealogical	inquiry.
1. What Is Williams’s Genealogy a Genealogy Of?
It	is	far	from	straightforward	to	say	exactly	what	the	subject	matter	of	
Williams’s	genealogy	is.	Some	commentators	present	it	as	a	genealogy	
of	truth,	and	the	Italian	translation	of	the	book	is	even	titled	Genealogia 
della verità.5	Others	urge	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed 
to	truth.6	The	reading	I	offer	in	this	section	splits	the	difference:	it	pres-
ents	Truth and Truthfulness	 as	 a	 genealogical	 explanation	of	why	we	
might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically,	where	this	means	valuing	
the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness	intrinsically.
Williams’s	 repeated	 insistence	 that	 the	 concept	of	 truth	does	not	
have	a	history	(TT	61,	271)	might	be	taken	to	entail	that	there	cannot	
be	a	genealogy	of	truth.	But	does	the	fact	that	a	concept	lacks	a	history	
really	exclude	giving	a	genealogy	of	that	concept?	Williams’s	reason	
for	maintaining	that	the	concept	of	truth	lacks	a	history	is	that	it	is	an	
indefinable	part	of	a	ramifying	set	of	connected	notions	which	play	a	
basic	 role	 in	 language	 and	 thought.7	This	 role	 “is	 always	 and	every-
where	the	same”	(TT	61,	271).	Truth	is	a	formal	concept	that	we	cannot	
5.	 Blackburn	(2002)	and	Mordacci	(2016).
6.	 This	emphasis	on	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth	is	found	in	Honderich	(2003,	
140),	Hacking	(2004,	157),	Elgin	(2005,	67),	and	Koopman	(2013).
7.	 Koopman	ascribes	to	Williams	the	view	that	“the	truth	itself”	does	“not	vary	
with	 history”	 (2013,	 69).	 But	Williams	 only	 takes	 the	 concept of truth to be 
historically invariable; the	truth	itself	will	be	the	truth	about	a	matter	to	hand,	
and	as	historically	variable	as	the	matter	itself	(see	TT	257).
functionality:	 the	phenomenon	whereby	 a	 practice	 is	 functional,	 but	
we	do	not	engage	 in	 it	 for	 its	 functionality,	and	 it	 is	only	 functional	
because	we	do	not	engage	in	it	for	its	functionality.	Key	to	this	read-
ing	will	be,	first,	to	get	clear	about	what	exactly	Williams’s	genealogy	
is	a	genealogy	of;3	and	second,	to	read	Williams	as	a	type	of	pragma-
tist	—	notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	 pragmatists’	 is	 the	 label	 he	
gives	 to	 his	 opponents.	 Williams’s	 genealogy	 merits	 the	 label	 of	 a	
‘pragmatic	 genealogy’	 in	 two	 respects:	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 practices	 re-
volving	around	truth	 instead	of	asking	what	 truth	 itself	 is;	and	it	ex-
plains	these	practices	in	terms	of	their	point	for	creatures	like	us.	View-
ing	Williams’s	genealogy	as	a	pragmatic genealogy	allows	us	to	see	it	
not	as	a	piece	of	erudite	historical	stage-setting,	but	as	a	direct	answer	
to	Richard	Rorty’s	question:	Why	 should	we	value	 the	 truth?	While	
Rorty	 concludes	 that	we	are	better	off	dropping	 the	notion	of	 truth	
altogether,4	Williams’s	genealogy	offers	a	contrary	answer	by	display-
ing	 the	 instrumental	 value	of	 valuing	 the	 truth	 intrinsically.	 The	 ge-
nealogy	is	a	perspicuous	derivation,	from	needs	we	have	anyway,	of	
the	need	for	an	intrinsic	value	of	truth	—	and	in	showing	the	need	for	
the	value	of	truth	to	be	rooted	in	practical	exigencies,	Williams	proves	
Rorty	wrong	by	his	own	lights.
The	paper	falls	 into	three	parts,	the	first	two	setting	the	stage	for	
the	third.	In	§1,	 I	 tackle	the	surprisingly	tricky	question	of	what	Wil-
liams’s	genealogy	is	a	genealogy	of.	The	difficulty,	I	argue,	stems	from	
the	fact	that	truthfulness	plays	a	double	role	as	both	act	and	object	of	
valuation.	I	argue	further	that	Williams’s	defence	of	the	value	of	truth	
turns	on	the	idea	that	while	we	cannot	abandon	the	concept	of	truth,	
we	can	abandon	our	concern	 for	 it,	and	 this	 is	why	he	eschews	 the	
question	of	what	truth	is	for	the	question	of	why we	should	cultivate	
truthfulness.	In	§2,	I	argue	that	Williams’s	genealogical	method	is	best	
3.	 Blackburn	 (2002)	 and	Mordacci	 (2016)	 present	 it	 as	 a	 genealogy	 of	 truth,	
while	Honderich	 (2003,	 140),	Hacking	 (2004,	 140),	 Elgin	 (2005,	 344),	 and	
Koopman	(2013)	insist	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed to truth.	
The	reading	I	offer	splits	the	difference.
4.	 See	especially	Rorty	and	Engel	(2007)	and	Rorty	(1998),	but	also	(1989,	1991).
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Williams’s	 lights,	 talking	 about	 the	 practical	 significance	 of	 truthful-
ness.10	Similarly,	the	histories	of	truth	offered	by	Foucault	(1994)	and	
Shapin	(1994)	are	best	understood	as	being	about	truthfulness.	It	is	a	
different	enterprise	again,	but	an	equally	viable	one,	to	explain	why	a	
community	which	did	not	have	a	word	for	truth	might	be	led	to	intro-
duce	one.	Being	able	to	describe	things	as	true	may	function	as	a	de-
vice	of	indirect	reference	and	generalisation,	enabling	us	to	endorse	or	
repudiate	claims	whose	content	we	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	specify:	
“I	think	that	everything	Wittgenstein	said	is	true”;	“Beware:	nothing	he	
says	will	be	true.”11 
If	viewing	 the	concept	of	 truth	as	 fundamental	does	not	bar	Wil-
liams	 from	giving	a	genealogy	 in	principle,	 it	nevertheless	provides	
him	with	a	reason	not	to	give	one	in	practice,	because	it	entails	that	
this	fundamental	concept	of	truth	is	not	what	needs	defending.	What	
needs	defending	is	our	concern with	the	truth	about	given	subject	mat-
ters.	For	many	subject	matters,	such	as	the	distant	past	or	the	intricate	
workings	of	nature,	this	concern	has	datable	beginnings;	the	corollary	
is	that	it	may	also	have	an	end.	It	is	this	latter	possibility	which	moti-
vates	Williams’s	vindicatory	project	and	its	focus	on	truthfulness.	The	
contrast	heralded	in	the	title	Truth and Truthfulness	brings	into	focus	a	
distinction between	a	formal	concept	that	we	cannot	help	but	live	by,	
and	a	social	and	historical	achievement	that	requires	continual	cultiva-
tion.	We	cannot	give	up	on	the	concept	of	truth,	least	of	all	if	we	are	to	
hold	on	to	truthfulness	(for	what	would	we	be	true	to?).12	But	we	can	
give	up	on	truthfulness,	in	the	sense	of	ceasing	to	value	the	finding	and	
sharing	of	the	truth	in	certain	areas. Williams	aims	to	defend	this	sense	
10. Price	(2011,	47,	139).	Of	course,	in	the	practice	of	arguing	about	how	things	
are,	truthfulness	is	not	the	only	way	to	achieve	outcomes	of	practical	value.	
There	 is	something	to	be	said	for	playing	devil’s	advocate,	or	 for	exploring	
and	defending	implausible	hypotheses.	There	has	been	a	lot	of	work	recently	
by	people	like	Liam	Kofi	Bright,	Remco	Heesen,	Cailin	O’Connor,	and	Kevin	
Zollman	on	whether	individuals	need	to	value	the	truth	in	order	to	promote	
collective	success	at	pursuing	the	truth.
11. Blackburn	(2013,	5)	and	M.	Williams	(2013,	135).
12. See	TT 2–3.
help	but	live	by.	This	is	not	an	empirical	claim	—	Williams	takes	it	to	
follow	from	Davidson’s	(1990)	hermeneutical	insight	that	the	concept	
of	truth	is	essential	to	understanding	something	as	a	believing	or	say-
ing	 that	 things	are	 thus-and-so,	and	 therefore	 to	understanding	any	
kind	of	variation	 in	 such	believings	or	 sayings.	 In	 recognising	 some-
thing	as	a	representation	of	things	as	being	thus-and-so,	we	are	always	
already	relying	on	the	concept	of	truth	in	this	basic	role.	
Williams	 thus	holds:	 (i)	 that	 the	concept	of	 truth	has	no	history;	
and	(ii)	that	truth	is	an	indefinable	part	of	a	set	of	connected	notions,	
such	as	belief	and	assertion,	which	have	to	be	learnt	together.8	Does	it	
follow	that	no	genealogy	of	the	concept	of	truth	can	be	given?	It	cer-
tainly	does	 if	one	equates	genealogy	with	history.	But	on	Williams’s	
own	conception	of	genealogy,	it	does	not	follow.	For	while	genealogy	
is	potentially	informed	by	history,	it	remains	distinct	from	it.	A	geneal-
ogy	of	the	concept	of	truth	can	still	be	given,	but	because	of	(ii),	we	
should	eschew	attempts	to	spell	out	what	truth	is	in	favour	of	asking	
why	creatures	like	us	might	have	developed	the	concept	of	truth	(along	
with	the	concepts	it	is	connected	to);	and	because	of	(i),	the	genealogy	
has	to	be	a	fictional	developmental	model.	As	a	model,	it	could	start	
off	with	agents	represented	as	lacking	what	historical	communities	al-
ways	already	possess,	and	it	could	represent	as	successively	emerging	
what	in	fact	has	to	arise	together.	It	might	thereby	exhibit	the	point	of	
the	concept	of	truth	and	the	basic	human	needs	from	which	it	derives.	
It	is	a	mark	of	the	power	of	genealogy,	for	Williams,	that	it	allows	us	
to	tell	a	developmental	story	highlighting	why	X	should	have	arisen	
even	where	we	find	 it	barely	 intelligible	 that	 there	 could	have	been	
a	development	towards	X.9	There	is	thus	nothing	here	to	prevent	us	
from	asking	 such	questions	 as	 “What	 are	 the	 concepts	 of	 truth	 and	
falsity	for?”	(Price	2011,	76).	But	when	Price	argues	that	one	function	
of	the	concept	of	truth	is	to	encourage	us	to	resolve	disagreements	in	
order	to	reap	the	benefits	of	arguing	about	how	things	are,	he	is,	by	
8.	 See	Williams	(1997a,	16–9; TT	45–53,	63,	84)	and	his	reference	to	Campbell	
(1994)	at	1997a,	91n8.
9.	 A	point	Williams	made	in	a	lecture	cited	in	Fricker	(1998,	165n13).
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of	incomprehension.	The	answer	only	begins	to	make	sense	once	we	
clarify	 that	we	 like	 to	 know	what	 people	 are	 talking	 about.	 Similar-
ly,	Williams	thinks	that	when	we	say	that	we	value	truth	intrinsically,	
what	we	mean	is	that	we	value	expressions	of	truthfulness	in	the	broad	
sense	 in	which	Williams	uses	 the	 term:	expressions	of	 the	desire	 to	
find	out	the	truth;	persistence	in	the	face	of	obstacles	to	inquiry;	im-
perviousness	to	wishful	thinking	and	self-deception;	and	care	and	dis-
cipline	in	forming	one’s	beliefs,	in	preserving	the	truth,	and	in	passing	
it	on	to	others.	The	use	of	metalinguistic	vocabulary	to	refer	to	intrin-
sic	values	is	best	understood	as	referring	to	human	dealings	revolving	
around	these	properties.	Hence,	for	Williams,	to	value	the	truth	intrin-
sically	is	to	value	various	states	and	activities	associated	with	the	truth,	
in	particular	the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness.	
But	since	to	value	the	truth	intrinsically	is	to	be	truthful,	truthfulness	is	
both	act	and	object	of	valuation	on	Williams’s	picture.
This	means	 that	 it	would	be	wrong	 to	 conclude	 that	Williams	 is	
concerned	with	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth:
[S]ome	may	complain	that	[…]	it	is	simply	these	qualities	
[involved	in	being	truthful]	that,	so	far,	are	supposed	to	
bear	the	value.	People	have	spoken	of	the	value	of	truth:	
is	this	what	they	had	in	mind?	Are	we	right	to	consider	
only	 certain	human	attitudes	 toward	 the	 truth,	people’s	
dispositions	 to	discover	 it	and	express	 it?	My	answer	 is	
yes	—	it	is	right	only	to	consider	human	attitudes.	Indeed,	
it	is	part	of	the	naturalistic	outlook	of	this	inquiry	that	it	
should	be	seen	as	an	exercise	in	human	self-understand-
ing.	(TT	60)
Williams	refuses	to	regard	as	an	explanation	a	“metaphysical	account	
which	represents	the	objects	of	our	knowledge	and	their	value	as	in	
themselves	entirely	independent	of	our	thoughts	or	attitudes”,	or	any	
other	explanation	“that	sets	truth	and	goodness	even	further	above	us”	
(TT	61).	Instead,	his	explanation	of	the	value	of	truth	takes	the	form	of	
of	the	value	of	truth,	expressed	in	the	concern	to	get	one’s	beliefs	right	
(the	set	of	dispositions	Williams	labels	“Accuracy”)	and	the	concern	to	
pass	them	on	to	others	(the	set	of	dispositions	he	labels	“Sincerity”),	
which	together	form	the	“virtues	of	truth”.	He	seeks	to	defend	the	vir-
tues	of	truth	by	exhibiting	their	point	for	us.
There	are	two	potentially	confusing	ambiguities	in	Williams’s	talk	
of	 the	 value	 of	 truth	 and	 truthfulness	 which	 bear	 clarification.	Wil-
liams	writes	that	he	is	concerned	throughout	the	book	with	“the	value	
of	truth”	(TT	6).	But	he	hastens	to	add	that,	strictly	speaking,	it	is	not 
truth	itself	that	bears	value:
In	a	very	strict	sense,	to	speak	of	“the	value	of	truth”	is	no	
doubt	a	category	mistake:	truth,	as	a	property	of	proposi-
tions	or	sentences,	is	not	the	sort	of	thing	that	can	have	a	
value.	[…]	The	phrase	“the	value	of	truth”	should	be	taken	
as	shorthand	for	the	value	of	various	states	and	activities	
associated	with	the	truth.	Much	of	the	discussion	will	be	
directed	 to	 the	value	of	what	 I	 shall	 call	 the	 “virtues	of	
truth,”	qualities	of	people	that	are	displayed	in	wanting	to	
know	the	truth,	in	finding	it	out,	and	in	telling	it	to	other	
people.	(TT	6–7)
Why	can	truth	as	a	property	of	propositions	not	have	value?	After	all,	
to	take	an	example	Williams	uses	elsewhere,	when	someone	believes	
against	all	evidence	to	the	contrary	that	her	child	survived	the	crash,	
the	truth	of	her	belief	is	of	immense	value	to	that	person.	But,	for	Wil-
liams,	this	 is	the	value	of	a	particular	truth	p,	where	the	value	of	p’s	
being	true	just	 is	 the	value	of	p,	and	“[t]his	 is	not	the	value	of	truth,	
but	 the	value	of	survival”	 (1995d,	231).	And	even	when	we	ask	after	
the	value	of	truth	in	general,	Williams	thinks,	we	are	not	really	asking	
after	the	value	possessed	by	truth.	This	would	be	like	asking	after	the	
value	possessed	by	reference	in	general,	or	by	meaning,	or	by	other	
metalinguistic	 categories.	 If	we	were	 asked	 to	 list	 all	 the	 things	we	
value	intrinsically,	answering	“reference”	would	provoke	blank	stares	
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defending	is	not	our	concept	of	truth,	but	our	concern	for	it.	In	this	con-
text,	Socratic	questions	about	the	nature	of	truth	are	better	transposed	
into	pragmatic	questions	about	 the	point	of	 truthfulness.	 Instead	of	
gazing	up	at	truth	itself,	we	should	face	the	deniers	with	our	eyes	set	
on	human	concern	with	the	truth,	bring	out	how	it	relates	to	the	rest	of	
human	psychology	and	to	various	social	and	political	issues,	and	show	
what	concern	with	the	truth	does	for	us.	This	is	the	task	shouldered	by	
Williams’s	genealogy.
2. Williams’s Pragmatic Genealogical Method
What	does	Williams	understand	by	a	“genealogy”?	In	Truth and Truth-
fulness,	he	offers	the	following	characterisation:	“A	genealogy	is	a	nar-
rative	that	tries	to	explain	a	cultural	phenomenon	by	describing	a	way	
in	which	it	came	about,	or	could	have	come	about,	or	might	be	imag-
ined	to	have	come	about”	(TT	20).	On	this	broad	characterisation,	ge-
nealogy	is	a	form	of	explanation drawing	on	everything	from	historical	
references	and	conjectures	to	abstract	and	imaginary	developmental	
stories	in	order	to	elucidate	something	via	its	genesis.
But	what	is	the	purpose	of	the	imaginary	elements?	Their	central-
ity	to	Williams’s	understanding	of	genealogy	comes	out	in	his	article	
“Naturalism	and	Genealogy”,	in	which	he	characterises	genealogy	en-
tirely	in	terms	of	these	imaginary	elements.	He	defines	genealogy	as	
“a	 fictional	 story	which	 represents	 a	 new	 reason	 for	 action	 as	 being	
developed	in	a	simplified	situation	as	a	function	of	motives,	reactions,	
psychological	 processes	 which	 we	 have	 reason	 to	 acknowledge	 al-
ready”	(2000,	159).	On	this	narrower	view,	genealogy	has	four	charac-
teristics:	(i)	it	is	a	developmental	narrative	sketching	how	one	can	get	
from	some	starting	point	at	which	there	is	as	yet	no	X	to	an	end	point	
at	which	there	is	X;	(ii)	it	explains	the	emergence	of	a	new	reason	for	
action	in	terms	of	more	primitive	reasons	for	action	which	it	takes	as	
given;	(iii)	the	transition	from	the	starting	point	to	the	end	point	is	ra-
tionally	intelligible	(as	opposed	to	only	causally	intelligible);	and	(iv)	
the	rational	transition	from	starting	point	to	end	point	is	not	just	a	mat-
ter	of	instrumental	reasoning	—	what	makes	genealogies	interesting	is	
self-understanding	in	the	sense	that	it	starts	out	from	our dispositions 
to	value	the	truth	and	explains	these	in	terms	of	their	practical	value	
to us.	Williams’s	approach	is	thus	naturalistic	in	a	sense	akin	to	what	
Huw	Price	calls	subject naturalism:13	it	approaches	the	value	of	truth	via	
human	dispositions	to	truthfulness,	and	these	in	turn	via	their	point	
relative	to	basic	human	needs.
Even	once	we	 gain	hold	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 intrinsic	 valuing	 of	
truth	manifests	itself	in	truthfulness	and	involves	the	valuing	of	truth-
fulness,	and	that	truthfulness	therefore	plays	a	double	role	as	both	act	
and	object	of	valuation,	there	remains	a	second	hazardous	ambiguity	
in	the	phrase	‘the	value	of	truthfulness’.	It	can	be	used	in	an	appositio-
nal	or	a	possessive	sense.	In	the	appositional	sense,	it	picks	out	one	
among	our	values,	namely	that	of	truthfulness.	Reference	to	the	“value	
of	truthfulness”	is	then	a	reference	to	our	valuing the truth,	manifested	
in	our	seeking,	preserving,	and	telling	it,	i.e.,	in	our	being	truthful	(e.g.,	
TT	13).	By	contrast,	the	possessive	sense	concerns	the	value	that	truth-
fulness	possesses	for	creatures	like	us.	It	refers	to	the	practical value of 
our valuing the	truth,	 i.e.,	 the	practical	value	of	 truthfulness	(e.g.,	TT 
15).
With	these	clarifications	in	place,	we	can	state	precisely	what	Wil-
liams’s	genealogy	 is	 a	genealogy	of.	 It	 is	 a	genealogical	explanation	
of	why	we	might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically	—	where	this	
means	valuing	the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthful-
ness	 intrinsically	—	which	 is	 given	 in	 terms	of	 the	practical	 value	of	
valuing	truth	intrinsically.
It	thus	misses	Williams’s	point	to	say	that	the	book’s	title	is	“ironi-
cally	misleading”	in	promising	a	treatment	of	truth.14	It	is	a	treatment	
of	truth,	only	one	that	carries	with	it	the	claim	that	the	way	to	meet	
those	who	would	give	up	on	truth	is	not	to	ask	what	truth	is,	or	which	
theory	of	truth	we	should	adopt,	but	why we	should	cultivate	the	vir-
tues	aiming	at	truth,	and	what	we	have	to	lose	if	we	do	not.	What	needs	
13. See	Price	(2011,	189).
14. Elgin	(2005,	344).
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developments	are	only	weakly,	and	which	are	not	at	all,	anticipatable	
on	the	basis	of	generic	human	needs.	We	are	thus	led	by	these	struc-
tural	 insights	 to	 look,	 as	Williams	 does,	 for	 the	 historical	moments	
around	which	truthfulness	came	to	be	extended	to	the	distant	past,	or	
when	it	grew	into	a	demand	for	authenticity.
Genealogies	have	 to	 start	 somewhere,	 and	 in	doing	 so	 they	will	
have	 to	 take	 certain	 things	 for	 granted.15	 Williams	 is	 unapologetic	
about	this:	“critical	reflection	should	seek	for	as	much	shared	under-
standing	as	it	can	find	on	any	issue,	and	use	any	ethical	material	that,	
in	the	context	of	the	reflective	discussion,	makes	some	sense	and	com-
mands	some	loyalty.	Of	course	that	will	take	things	for	granted,	but	as	
serious	reflection	it	must	know	it	will	do	that”	(2011,	117).	Nevertheless,	
Williams	tries	to	take	as	 little	 for	granted	as	possible.16	He	starts	out	
from	a	state-of-nature	model	depicting	a	basic	and,	 in	human	terms,	
entirely	generic	epistemic	predicament:	human	beings	need	informa-
tion	about	 the	environment,	 its	 risks,	 and	 its	opportunities	 (TT	 58);	
but	already	the	sheer	fact	that	they	are	in	different	places	at	different	
times	means	 that	 there	are	 strong	pragmatic	pressures	on	 them	not	
just	to	rely	on	their	senses	in	acquiring	it,	but	to	cooperate,	in	particu-
lar	by	engaging	in	an	epistemic division of labour	whereby	information	is	
pooled	(TT	42);	this	in	turn	means	that	they	need	to	cultivate	the	dis-
positions	that	make	good	contributors	to	the	pool:	centrally,	accuracy 
and	sincerity	in	some	prototypical	form.	But	since	the	practical	value	of	
these	dispositions	largely	consists	in	their	advantageousness	to	others,	
accuracy	 and	 sincerity	need	 to	 come	 to	be	 regarded	 as	 traits	worth	
having	 for	 their	 own	 sake	—	as	 virtues	—	if	 the	 practice	 of	 effective	
15. See	Blackburn	(2002)	and	Hall	(2014,	556).
16. “We	must	be	cautious,”	he	writes	elsewhere,	“in	dogmatically	asserting	that	
some	given	elements	must	be	universal	[…].	However,	even	if	we	do	not	of-
fer	any	rich	body	of	what	are	claimed	to	be	substantive	universal	necessities,	
there	is,	in	the	area	of	action	and	its	ethical	surroundings,	a	set	of	very	basic	
ideas	which,	at	the	least,	lay	an	extremely	heavy	burden	of	proof	on	anyone	
who	claims	to	find	a	society	in	which	these	conceptions	were	not	operative”	
(2006b,	67).	See	also	Williams	(2011,	170),	where	he	advocates	a	naturalistic	
and	historical	conception	of	human	nature.
precisely	that	the	individual	cannot	reason	his	way	from	the	starting	
point	to	the	end	point	on	his	own.	The	end	point	is	instrumentally inac-
cessible	 to	the	individual	reasoner	(in	this	case,	as	we	shall	see	in	§3,	
because	 it	 involves	 the	creation	of	an	 intrinsic	value).	Williams’s	ge-
nealogy	of	truthfulness exhibits	all	four	characteristics	of	the	fictional	
story,	but	it	also	recognises	a	need	for	philosophy	to	involve	itself	in	
history	(TT	93)	—	hence	the	broader	characterisation	of	genealogy.
Williams’s	genealogy	deploys	a	narrative	device	he	calls	the	“State	
of	Nature”	(TT	21).	It	differs	from	homonymous	scenarios	in	political	
philosophy	 in	 that	 it	 already	 contains	 “a	 small	 society	of	human	be-
ings,	sharing	a	common	language,	with	no	elaborate	technology	and	
no	form	of	writing”	(TT	41).	But	it	is	not,	for	all	that,	a	representation	
of	any	actual	society,	nor	even	a	conjectural	representation	of	the	early	
hominid	 condition.	 The	 State	 of	Nature,	Williams	 insists,	 is	 not	 the	
Pleistocene	(TT	27).	We	do	not	read	off	what	to	put	into	the	State	of	
Nature	from	the	fossil	record.	In	fact,	the	State	of	Nature	does	not	even	
have	to	be	possible	(TT	30).	
I	suggest	that	the	State	of	Nature	is	most	illuminatingly	described	
not	as	a	fiction,	but	as	a	model,	which	abstracts	as	much	from	past	hu-
man	societies	as	from	present	ones.	The	purpose	of	this	model	is	not,	
in	 the	 first	 instance,	 to	 identify	 the	historical	 origins	 of	 truthfulness,	
but	to	identify	its	structural	origins.	It	serves	to	localise	and	bring	out	
the	function	of	the	virtues	of	truth	relative	to	certain	contingent	facts	
about	 human	 beings	 and	 their	 environment.	 It	 contributes	 to	what	
Williams	elsewhere	calls	a	“structural	description”	(1997b,	24)	of	truth-
fulness	and	its	roots	in	certain	basic	needs.	It	is	only	in	a	second	step	
that	 these	structural	 insights	can	 then	be	deployed	 to	 shed	 light	on	
truthfulness’s	actual	history.	The	structural	insights	into	the	necessity	
of	a	certain	prototypical	form	of	truthfulness	lead	us	to	expect	that	any	
society	will	always	already	possess	an	instantiation	of	this	prototype.	
In	light	of	this	prototype	and	its	basic	point,	moreover,	functional	anal-
ogies	will	become	visible	between	different	phenomena,	so	that	the	
prototype	helps	us	 identify	different	 instantiations	of	 truthfulness	 in	
the	historical	record.	The	same	structural	insights	also	indicate	which	
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himself.17	As	Williams’s	subtitle	acknowledges,	his	genealogical	meth-
od	was	 largely	 inspired	by	Craig, whose	genealogy	 is	 recognised	as	
exemplifying	a	form	of	pragmatism	(Weinberg	2006).	Williams	adopts	
it	nearly	wholesale	to	expand	on	the	willingness	of	informants	to	be	
truthful,	thereby	falling	squarely	into	the	tradition	which	Cheryl	Misak	
calls	“Cambridge	pragmatism”	(2016).
One	can	distinguish	truth-denying	from	truth-affirming	pragmatists.18 
Williams	argues	against	the	former	(as	represented	by	Rorty),	but	on	
grounds	 that	 place	 him	 squarely	 among	 the	 latter	—	not	 merely	 be-
cause	he	 affirms	 truth,	 but	 because	his	 approach	 to	 it	 is	 pragmatist	
in	 all	 but	 name.	 A	 truth-affirming	 pragmatist	 strives	 “to	 illuminate	
the	 concept	 of	 truth	 by	 considering	 its	 linkages	with	 inquiry,	 asser-
tion,	and	the	acquisition	of	belief”	(Misak	2016,	28).19	Williams,	in	line	
with	the	pragmatist	idea	that	the	best	understanding	of	philosophy’s	
subject	matter	is	agent-centred,	elucidates	truth	in	terms	of	the	various	
“states	 and	 activities	 associated	with	 the	 truth”	 (TT	 7).	 He	 eschews	
questions	such	as	what	truth	is,	asking	instead	after	the	role	of	truth	in	
various	human	dealings,	such	as	language	learning,	believing,	assert-
ing,	inquiring,	communicating,	and	cooperating.	Part	of	what	licenses	
the	application	of	the	label	to	Williams,	then,	is	that	he	elucidates	truth	
in	terms	of	what	we do	with	truth:	the	human	dealings	expressive	of	
truthfulness.
What	also	licenses	the	label’s	application	is	that	Williams	raises	a	
pragmatist	question	in	the	reverse	direction,	namely	what truthfulness 
does for us.	He	argues	that	truthfulness	“gets	its	point	ultimately	from	
the	human	interest,	individual	and	collective,	in	gaining	and	sharing	
true	 information”	 (TT	 126).	Williams’s	genealogy	can	 thus	be	under-
stood	without	distortion	as	a	pragmatic genealogy	—	an	explanation	
17. Misak	 (2016)	 traces	 these	 under-appreciated	 strands	 of	 pragmatism	 from	
Peirce	to	Wittgenstein.	See	also	Misak	and	Price	(2017).
18. Misak	(2016,	ix)	and	M.	Williams	(2013,	129;	2016,	223).
19. See	Wiggins	(2002,	316)	and	Misak	(2015,	264).
information	pooling	is	to	avoid	succumbing	to	free	riders	(TT	59).	For	
this	to	be	the	case,	people	need	to	be	able	to	make sense	of	them	as	val-
ues	“from	the	inside”	(TT	91),	which	requires	being	able	to	articulate	
and	connect	them	to	other	values	and	emotions.	But	while	the	func-
tionalist	abstraction	of	the	State	of	Nature	can	reveal	that	this	is	so,	it	
cannot	show	how	these	generic	demands	have	actually	been	satisfied	
now	and	around	here.	Nor	can	it	help	us	understand	the	“enormous	
degree”	to	which	truthfulness	was	“changed,	transformed,	differently	
embodied,	 extended	 and	 so	 on	 by	 historical	 experience”	 (Williams	
2007,	132).	This	is	the	reason	why	the	perspicuous	representation	of	
what	truthfulness	does	for	us	needs	to	be	enriched	with	historical	and	
cultural	 information	 that	 is	 invisible	 from	 the	 a priori standpoint	 of	
functional	reflection.	We	need	to	incorporate	increasingly	local	needs	
into	our	model	of	truthfulness’s	development	in	order	to	account	for	
the	elaborations	that	our	instantiations	of	the	virtues	of	accuracy	and	
sincerity	have	undergone.
On	such	a	reading,	Williams’s	genealogy	is	a	pragmatic	genealogy:	
an	explanation	of	why	we	came	by	a	certain	conceptual	or	evaluative	
practice	in	terms	of	what it does for us,	given	our	needs.	Historical	con-
siderations	only	come	in	to	explain	the	various	respects	in	which	the	
practice	we	actually	have	differs	from	the	generic	functional	model	of	
the	practice	we	require,	given	our	needs.	This	allows	us	to	take	his	ge-
nealogy	as	a	direct	response	to	Rorty’s	question	of	why	we	should	val-
ue	the	truth.	The	answer	it	yields	is	that	we	should	value	it	because	do-
ing	so	is	highly	functional	for	us,	given	some	of	our	most	basic	needs.	
If	Williams	offers	a	pragmatic	genealogy,	he	has	more	in	common	
with	his	avowed	opponents	than	he	admits.	The	immediate	objection	
to	this	is	that	the	book	is	explicitly	directed	against	“the	pragmatists”	
(TT	59)	who	encourage	us	to	relinquish	talk	of	“truth”.	But	pragmatism	
is	a	broad	church,	and	much	effort	has	 recently	gone	 into	highlight-
ing	the	more	truth-affirming	strands	of	pragmatism.	These	lead	from	
Peirce	 to	 Ramsey,	Wittgenstein,	 E.	J.	 Craig,	 and,	 I	 submit,	 Williams	
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(2)	 The Utilitarianism Challenge:	 “the	 functional	 account	
looks	like	a	thinly	disguised	form	of	utilitarianism,	an	ar-
gument	to	the	effect	that	truthfulness	is	good	because	it	
increases	the	general	level	of	human	well-being.”
(3)	The Redundancy Challenge:	“once	this	is	seen	the	gene-
alogy	itself	becomes	theoretically	redundant.”21
McGinn’s	 first	 challenge,	 that	 instrumental	 considerations	 in	 fa-
vour	of	truthfulness	do	nothing	to	vindicate	its	intrinsic	value,	renders	
acute	the	question	of	just	what	Williams’s	genealogy	aims	to	achieve.	
One	thing	Williams	offers	is	a	negative	vindication	of	truthfulness:	his	
genealogy	does	not	excavate	anything	to	suggest	our	endorsement	of	
truthfulness	to	be	radically	self-deceived,	thus	clearing	truthfulness	of	
suspicion	and	marking	it	out	as	stable	under	reflection.	Another	thing	
he	offers	is	a	naturalistic	vindication	of	truthfulness:	the	genealogy	en-
ables	us	 to	make	sense	of	 truthfulness	 in	 terms	of	 the	rest	of	nature,	
in	particular	in	terms	of	basic	needs	of	cooperation	and	communica-
tion.	Both	of	these	vindications	ensure	that	we	can	remain	confident	
in	truthfulness
[…]	 in	 the	 sense	 that	we	 can	 understand	 it	 and	 at	 the	
same	time	respect	it,	support	it	and	live	within	it.	We	can	
also	 urge	 it	 against	 alternative	 creeds	 whose	 own	 self-
understandings	 (as	 divine	 revelations,	 for	 instance)	 are	
themselves	 not	 going	 to	 survive	 a	 genealogical	 inquiry.	
(2014,	410)
Yet,	 as	 the	 preceding	 section	 brought	 out,	Williams	 also	 offers	 a	
pragmatic	vindication	of	truthfulness.	His	genealogy	reveals	the	point 
of	truthfulness,	which	it	is	shown	to	possess	relative	to	needs	so	basic	
that	they	would	be	at	work	in	anything	recognisable	as	a	human	soci-
ety.	It	is	with	respect	to	these	needs	that	truthfulness	proves	its	worth.	
21. McGinn	(2003,	§1).
of	why	we	might	have	come	to	value	the	truth	in	terms	of	the	point of	
valuing	the	truth.20
3. McGinn’s Three Challenges and Self-Effacing Functionality
Against	 the	 background	 of	 these	 remarks	 on	Williams’s	 object	 and	
method,	we	can	turn	to	the	vindicatory	power	of	pragmatic	genealogy,	
its	relation	to	indirect	utilitarianism,	and	its	application	to	self-effacing	
functionality.	A	helpful	way	into	these	questions	is	the	critique	of	Wil-
liams’s	genealogy	advanced	by	Colin	McGinn,	which	I	shall	use	as	a	
foil.	McGinn	not	only	highlights	the	resemblance	of	Williams’s	genea-
logical	method	to	just	the	kind	of	utilitarianism	of	which	Williams	was	
an	arch-critic,	but	also	calls	into	question	the	method	of	pragmatic	ge-
nealogy	more	widely.	We	learn	much	about	the	contours	of	Williams’s	
genealogy	by	determining	whether	it	stands	up	to	McGinn’s	critique.
According	to	McGinn,	Williams’s	genealogy	is	vulnerable	to	the	fol-
lowing	three	challenges:
(1)	The No Intrinsic Value Challenge:	“showing	the	function	
that	 a	 virtue	 serves	 can	only	 give	 it	 instrumental	 value,	
not	 intrinsic	 value	 […].	 Since	 Williams	 insists,	 rightly,	
that	truthfulness	has	an	intrinsic	value,	[…]	his	functional	
story	fails,	by	his	own	standards,	to	capture	that	intrinsic	
value;	so	it	does	nothing,	really,	to	vindicate	the	intrinsic	
value	of	truthfulness.”
20. Belabouring	the	question	of	how	to	label	Williams’s	genealogy	may	seem	to	
run	counter	 to	his	own	deep	suspicion	of	 labels.	He	 repeatedly	makes	 the	
point	that	they	stand	in	the	way	of	truthful	inquiry,	recounting	how,	after	a	
lecture	Ryle	had	given	in	Germany,	a	student	had	said:	“I	was	very	impressed	
by	your	lecture	and	would	like	to	join	your	school.	Unfortunately,	I	am	a	Kan-
tian”	(1995c,	186;	2007,	130).	But	in	picking	out	his	target	by	the	label	of	prag-
matism,	Williams	 inevitably	 risks	obscuring	 the	pragmatism	pervading	his	
own	enterprise.	It	is	in	correcting	for	this	that	the	value	of	labelling	Williams	
as	a	Cambridge	pragmatist	lies	—	it	derives	its	value	not,	as	one	might	think,	
from	the	importance	we	attach	to	labels,	but	from	the	potential	disvalue	of	
attaching	importance	to	labels.
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necessity	—	a	matter	of	having	strong	instrumental	reasons	to	acquire	
something,	 given	 the	 needs	 and	 purposes	 one	 already	 has.	 Conse-
quently,	we	might	call	it	the	condition	of	Practical Exigency.	As	for	the	
second	condition,	we	might	call	it	the	condition	of	Conceptual and Affec-
tive Embeddedness:	valuers	of	truthfulness	must	be	able	to	make sense	of	
truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value	“from	the	inside”	(TT	91),	as	Williams	
put	it,	which	means	that	they	must	have	the	conceptual	and	emotional	
resources	necessary	for	them	to	relate	truthfulness	to	other	things	that	
they	value,	such	as	nobility	or	freedom	from	manipulation,	and,	cru-
cially,	to	their	emotions.23	This	indicates	a	contextualist	conception	of	
intrinsic	value	that	differs	markedly	from,	for	instance,	G.	E.	Moore’s	
conception	of	 intrinsic	value	 in	Principia Ethica	 (1993),	where	Moore	
tries	to	identify	intrinsic	goods	by	asking	whether	they	are	“such	that,	
if	they	existed	by themselves,	in	absolute	isolation,	we	should	yet	judge	
their	existence	to	be	good”	(236–7).	On	Williams’s	account,	by	contrast,	
something	can	have	intrinsic	value	only	if	the	agent	possesses	“some	
materials	in	terms	of	which	he	can	understand	this	value	in	relation	to	
other	values	that	he	holds”	(TT	92).	Williams	mentions	the	example	
of	Ancient	Greece,	where	truthfulness	was	made	sense	of	in	terms	of	
ideas	of	honour	and	shame	(1997a,	26;	TT	115);	at	other	times,	truth-
fulness	was	connected	with	freedom,	absence	of	manipulation,	equal-
ity,	and	self-respect.	Merely	seeing	the	benefits	of	valuing	something	
intrinsically	 is	not	enough	actually	 to	do	so.	But	 if	both	the	Practical 
Exigency	and	the	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness	conditions	hold,
[…]	we	have	not	simply	adopted	an	illusion	or	a	pretence	
of	 there	 being	 an	 intrinsic	 good.	 In	 fact,	 if	 these	 condi-
tions	 hold,	 that	 would	 be	 a	 very	 odd	 thing	 to	 say,	 im-
plying	 as	 it	 does	 that	 there	 is	 something	 further	which	
would	count	as	its	really	being	an	intrinsic	good,	of	which	
these	conditions	offer	only	a	surrogate	or	mock-up.	If	the	
23. Williams	(1973,	ch.	13).	See Goldie	(2009)	regarding	the	connection	Williams	
draws	between	values	and	emotions,	and	Kusch	(2009)	regarding	Williams’s	
view	of	values	as	coming	in	socially	shared	webs	and	systems	and	as	making	
sense	only	in	relation	to	each	other.	
And	as	Williams	urges	against	the	deniers,	that	is	very	much	a	reason 
not	to	give	it	up.	
It	is	here	that	McGinn’s	first	challenge	gets	a	grip.	A	pragmatic	vin-
dication	may	be	fine	as	far	as	it	goes,	but	it	does	not	go	far	enough;	
showing	 what	 function	 something	 serves	 can	 give	 it	 instrumental	
value,	but	not	intrinsic	value;	hence,	the	genealogy	fails	to	vindicate	
the	idea	that	truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable.	This	is	a	line	of	argu-
ment	which	Williams	himself	acknowledges	when	he	admits	that	his	
considerations	only	show	that	we	need	to	treat	truthfulness	as	though	
it	had	intrinsic	value	—	they	do	not	and	cannot	show	that	truthfulness	
does	in	fact	have	intrinsic	value	(TT	90).	
But	what	McGinn	fails	to	see	is	that	Williams	is	not	trying	to	give 
truthfulness	 intrinsic	 value	—	he	 is	 trying	 to	 vindicate	 the	 intrinsic	
value	 it	already has.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	genealogy	can	only	show	that,	
given	certain	basic	needs,	human	beings	need	to	treat	truthfulness	as	
an	intrinsic	good;	but	it	does	not	follow	that	this	amounts	to	mere	pre-
tence.	If	pragmatic	considerations	show	that	regarding	truthfulness	as	
an	intrinsic	good	is	instrumentally	necessary,	the	question	is	whether	
we	can	and	do	so	regard	it;	if	yes,	we	will	have	been	vindicated	in	doing	
so.	Williams	takes	the	following	two	conditions	to	be	sufficient,	albeit	
not	necessary,	for	X	to	be	an	intrinsic	good:
It	is	necessary	(or	nearly	necessary)	for	basic	human	pur-
poses	and	needs	that	human	beings	should	treat	X	as	an	
intrinsic	good.	
They	can	coherently	treat	X	as	an	intrinsic	good.22
The	first	thing	to	note	about	these	two	conditions	is	that	they	are	not	
necessary	conditions	—	Williams	is	not	committed	to	the	claim	that	all	
intrinsic	goods	are	goods	that	humans	need	to	treat	as	intrinsic	goods.	
But	he	 takes	 this	 to	be	 true	of	some	intrinsic	goods,	and	where	 this	
is	the	case,	realising	it	will	help	explain	why	they	are	intrinsic	goods.	
Furthermore,	 the	 necessity	 at	 issue	 in	 the	 first	 condition	 is	practical 
22. TT	92;	also	Williams	(2006b,	ch.	8).
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applications	of	this	general	contrast	(2006a,	135).	Williams	proposes	to	
explain	the	notion	of	being	an	intrinsic	good	in	terms	of	people	valuing 
it as	an	intrinsic	good	(for	instance,	by	saying	that	an	intrinsic	good	is	
what	a	wise	or	rational	person	would	value	as	an	intrinsic	good),	just	
as	we	explain	being	an	end	in	terms	of	someone	pursuing	it	as	an	end	
(this	 is	 not	 to	 identify	 intrinsic	 goodness	with	 final	 goodness:	 some	
things,	 like	natural	 beauty	 and	works	of	 art,	 are	 valued	 intrinsically	
without	 being	pursued	 as	 ends	 [2006a,	 135–6]).	Hence,	 “something	
is	 intrinsically	good	 if	we	need	 to	value	 it	as	 intrinsically	good,	and	
we	can	make	sense	of	our	doing	so”	(2006a,	136).	This	just	is	for	it	to	
fulfil	 the	Practical Exigency	 and	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness 
conditions.	
The	 core	 of	 the	 answer	 to	McGinn’s	 first	 challenge,	 then,	 is	 that	
functionality	is	not	supposed	to	give	truthfulness	intrinsic	value,	but	
to	 vindicate	 it	 as	 the	 intrinsic	 good	 it	 already	 is.	Williams	 only	 has	
to	show	that	we	need	to	value	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	good	and	
that	we	can	make	sense	of	our	doing	so.	He	achieves	this	by	deriving	
from	more	basic	needs	a	need	 to	value	 the	dispositions	of	accuracy	
and	sincerity	for	their	own	sake,	and	by	tracing	out	the	connections	
of	truthfulness	to	others	things	we	value.	To	do	this	is	to	construct	an	
intrinsic	good	—	not	in	the	sense	of	creating	it	ex nihilo,	but	in	the	sense	
of	drawing	together	and	establishing	connections	between	consider-
ations	that	are,	for	us,	already	there.
The	 book	 thereby	 pursues	 a	wider	 concern	—	to	 show	 that,	 in	 a	
seeming	 paradox,	 “intrinsic	 values	 […]	 have	 their	 uses”	 (TT	 127).	
In	 an	 atmosphere	 dominated	 by	what	Williams	 perceives	 as	 undue	
“scientism”,24	many	are	suspicious	of	intrinsic	values,	and	are	attracted	
by	theories	 like	utilitarianism	partly	because	these	promise	to	make	
sense	of	so	much	of	the	world	in	instrumental	terms,	which	can	seem	
like	 the	only	naturalistically	 intelligible	 form	of	value.	Any	such	the-
ory	has	to	be	grounded	in	some	intrinsic	values;	but	at	least	they	are	
kept	to	a	minimum.	Williams,	by	contrast,	makes	us	comfortable	with	
24. Williams	(2006b).
conditions	are	satisfied,	then	we	shall	have	constructed	an	
intrinsic	good.	(TT	92)
The	mistake	of	describing	Williams	as	holding	 that	we	 should	 treat	
truthfulness	as	 if	 it	were	an	 intrinsic	value	when	really	 it	 is	only	an	
instrumental	value	is	the	failure	to	notice	that	he	need	allow	no	sense	
to	the	term	‘intrinsic	value’	except	one	in	which	it	is	true	that	truthful-
ness	is	an	intrinsic	value.	
In	order	better	to	grasp	this	 line	of	 thought,	 it	helps	to	step	back	
from	his	genealogy	for	a	moment	to	understand	the	conception	of	in-
trinsic	value	in	relation	to	which	Williams	develops	his	own,	which	is	
Christine	Korsgaard’s.	Korsgaard	 contrasts	 “intrinsic”	with	 “extrinsic”	
on	the	one	hand,	and	“final”	with	“instrumental”	on	the	other	(1996,	
249).	She	maintains	that	these	are	different	contrasts	between	differ-
ent	 classes	of	 things.	 For	Williams,	however,	 it	 is	only	 the	 intrinsic/
extrinsic	contrast	which	captures	a	difference	between	things,	namely	
those	which	have	 their	value	 in	 themselves	and	those	which	derive	
it	from	something	else;	the	final/instrumental	contrast	distinguishes	
ways in	which	we	value	things,	namely	as	means	or	as	ends.
Williams	derives	 two	 ideas	 from	Korsgaard.	 First,	 the	 contrast	 to	
“valuing	something	as	an	end”	should	be	a	broader	category	than	just	
“valuing	it	as	a	means”.	It	should	be	something	like	“valuing	derivative-
ly”,	of	which	instrumental	valuing	 is	only	a	species	—	one	may	value	
going	to	the	concert	as	a	way	of	having	a	good	evening,	but	this	does	
not	mean	 that	we	 value	 it	 only	 as	 a	means	 (2006a,	 122–3).	 Second,	
“intrinsic	goodness”	as	it	occurs	in	the	intrinsic/extrinsic	contrast	is	a	
matter	of	how	we	explain	goodness,	and	 in	 this	context,	an	 intrinsic	
good	is	one	whose	goodness	is	self-explanatory	(2006a,	124).	
Williams	urges	us	to	“give	up	the	unrewarding	idea	of	intrinsic	good-
ness	being	self-explanatory”	(2006a,	136).	Instead,	intrinsic	goodness	
should	be	recast	in	the	same	terms	as	the	contrast	between	final	and	
instrumental,	as	a	matter	of	the	way	in	which	we	value	things.	The	fun-
damental	contrast	then	becomes	that	between	valuing intrinsically	and	
valuing derivatively.	Valuing	as	an	end	and	valuing	as	a	means	are	just	
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Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 McGinn’s	 second	 challenge,	 that	 Williams’s	
functional	 story	constitutes	a	 thinly	disguised	 form	of	utilitarianism.	
This	need	not	be	problematic	in	itself,	but	it	would	be	a	problem	by	
Williams’s	own	lights,	since	the	form	of	utilitarianism	his	vindication	
most	 closely	 resembles	 is	 the	 indirect	 utilitarianism	 he	 himself	 im-
pugned	 as	 unstable	 under	 reflection.28	 Turning	Williams’s	 objection	
back	on	himself,	we	might	say	that	the	attempt	to	justify	the	disposi-
tion	to	value	truthfulness	intrinsically	on	purely	instrumental	grounds	
leads	 to	 a	 tension	between	 the	 spirit being justified	 and	 the	 spirit jus-
tified. Under	 reflection,	such	a	structure	 is	bound	 to	unravel.	This	 is	
not	for	the	reason	we	encountered	above:	that	we	need	to	be	able	to	
make	sense	of	the	spirit	being	justified	from	the	inside.	The	reason	it	is	
unstable	under	reflection	is	that	it	tries	to	combine	the	following	two	
incompatible	thoughts:
(1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable.
(2)	Truthfulness	is	only	instrumentally	valuable.
Indirect	utilitarianism	typically	tries	to	relieve	the	tension	by	appeal-
ing	to	a	distinction	between	theory	and	practice:	we	might	think	(2)	in	
what	Joseph	Butler	called	the	“cool	hour”	of	reflection,	yet	in	the	thick	
of	the	action,	we	focus	firmly	on	(1).	But	on	Williams’s	own	account,	
the	distinction	possesses	“no	saving	power”	(1995b,	165).	How	is	his	
own	story	any	different?
One	difference	is	that	because	Williams	does	not	share	the	utilitar-
ian’s	commitment	to	there	being	only	one	really intrinsically	valuable	
type	of	 thing	 (“well-being”	 in	McGinn’s	version),	Williams	 is	 free	 to	
maintain	that	the	two	thoughts	being	combined	are	really	these:
(1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable.
(2′)	Truthfulness	is	instrumentally	valuable.
28. Williams	and	Smart	(1973)	and	Williams	(1995b,	ch.	13;	TT	90–1;	2011,	ch.	6).
intrinsic	values	—	partly	by	showing	 that	 they	can	be	made	sense	of	
without	deteriorating	into	pretence,	and	partly	by	showing	that	intrin-
sic	valuing	is	instrumentally	indispensable.
Nevertheless,	there	are	limitations	to	pragmatic	genealogies’	vindi-
catory	force.	They	come	into	view	as	soon	as	one	asks:	A	vindication	
for whom?	Williams’s	genealogy	yields	pragmatic	 reasons,	 individual	
and	collective,	to	cultivate	the	virtues	of	truthfulness,	and	shows	why,	
beyond	a	certain	critical	mass,	communication	will	not	survive	failure	
in	 that	 respect	—	there	are	only	so	many	deceivers	 the	 institution	of	
truthfulness	can	take.	Yet	realising	this	does	not	provide	someone	who	
has	a	strong	inclination	to	deceive	with	a	reason	to	desist.	 It	merely	
constitutes	an	external	justification	which	gets	no	internal	hold	on	the	
deceiver.25	The	thought	that if everyone were like the deceiver, he could not 
exist	will	only	get	a	grip,	and	turn	the	external	justification	into	an	in-
ternal	one,	to	the	extent	that	he	otherwise	shares	in	the	ethical	life,	be-
cause	this	imagined	universalisation	is	an	essentially	ethical	thought.26 
The	genealogy	offers	reasons	for	those	who	already	see	truthfulness	as	
intrinsically	valuable	to	continue	to	do	so.	It	is	in	line	with	the	aim	Wil-
liams	formulates	for	ethical	discourse:	“not	to	control	the	enemies	of	
the	community	or	its	shirkers	but,	by	giving	reason	to	people	already	
disposed	to	hear	it,	to	help	in	continually	creating	a	community	held	
together	by	that	same	disposition”	(2011,	31).	The	genealogy	is	not	an	
instrument	of	conversion.	But	it	can	promote	self-understanding,	and	
thereby	strengthen	the	confidence	of	those	who	are,	in	some	measure,	
already	disposed	to	be	truthful.27
25. Williams	(1973,	252–3).
26. Williams’s	commitment	to	reasons internalism	shines	through	here:	A	has	rea-
son	to	φ	only	if	there	is	a	sound	deliberative	route	from	A’s	subjective	moti-
vational	set	S	to	A’s	φ-ing	(Williams	2001,	91).	He	even	reads	Kant’s	theory	as	
a	 limiting	case	of	reasons	 internalism	(1995c,	220n3).	 In	seeking	to	ground	
his	derivation	of	the	need	for	truthfulness	in	maximally	widely	shared	needs,	
Williams’s	 genealogy	 likewise	 constitutes	 a	 limiting	 case	 of	 internalism.	
Thanks	to	A.	W.	Moore	for	the	pointer.
27.	 See	Queloz	(2018)	for	further	discussion.
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Some	have	nevertheless	questioned	that	we	can	be	“aware	at the 
same time	of	the	intrinsic	quality	of	a	value	and	of	its	instrumental	qual-
ity”	(Hartmann	and	Saar	2004,	392)	in	the	way	Williams	suggests.30	Yet,	
upon	 closer	 inspection,	 his	 genealogy	 avoids	 this	 question	 anyway:	
the	instrumental	value	is	not	located	at	the	same	level	as	the	intrinsic	
value;	while	what	is	intrinsically	valuable	is	truthfulness	itself,	it	is	the	
valuing	of	truthfulness	as	intrinsically	valuable	which	is	instrumentally	
valuable.
This	 act/object	 distinction	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	 answering	McGinn’s	
third	challenge:	that	once	we	recognise	the	allegedly	“utilitarian”	na-
ture	of	the	genealogy,	it	becomes	redundant:	a	functional	account	can	
be	given	directly,	without	the	developmental	story.	But	this	is	precisely	
what	Williams	is	at	pains	to	deny,	and	what	sets	his	genealogy	apart	
from	more	reductionist	forms	of	functionalism.	We	must	distinguish	
between:	(i)	a	purely	functional	account	of	why	we	engage	in	our	ac-
tual	practice;	(ii)	a	purely	functional	account	of	why	a	prototype	of	the	
practice	would	arise	in	a	state-of-nature	model;	and	(iii)	a	historically	
informed	account	of	why	we	engage	 in	our	actual	practice.	 It	 is	not	
entirely	clear	whether	McGinn	means	to	suggest	that	if	we	do	(i),	then	
(ii)	and	(iii)	are	redundant;	or	that	if	we	do	(ii),	then	(iii)	is	redundant.	
But	either	way,	Williams	disagrees,	since	his	position	is	that	(i)	is	mis-
guided	and	that	both	(ii)	and	(iii)	are	required.
Williams	takes	(i),	the	purely	functional	account	of	why	we	engage	
in	our	actual	practice,	to	be	misguided.	One	may	well	be	impressed	by	
the	functionality	of	many	practices,	and	it	is	accordingly	tempting	to	
conclude	that	the	motives	upholding	them	are	themselves	functional	
or	instrumental	motives.	But,	for	Williams,	this	would	be	a	mistake:	“In	
relation	to	institutions,	practices,	expectations,	and	values	that	actual-
ly	exist,	of	justice,	promise-keeping,	truthfulness,	and	so	on,	functional	
accounts	are	simply	false;”	it	is	“just	not	true”,	he	continues,	“that	the	
30. Hartmann	and	Saar	take	Williams	to	be	reacting	to	what	they	perceive	as	a	
problem	by	integrating	“an	instrumental	component	[…]	into	the	very	defini-
tion	of	intrinsicness”,	i.e.	maintaining	that	“‘intrinsic’	just	means	‘non-egocen-
tric’	or	‘not	merely	self-interested’”	(2004,	393).	I	offer	a	different	reading	of	
Williams’s	conception	of	intrinsic	value	above.
On	the	indirect	utilitarian	account,	the	recognition	of	truthfulness’s	in-
strumental	value	is	achieved	at	the	cost	of	its	intrinsic	value.	But	with	
(2′),	 there	 is	no	 longer	a	contradiction,	 since	 the	 instrumental	value	
ascribed	is	not	exclusive.	The	recognition	of	 instrumental	value	coex-
ists	harmoniously	with	that	of intrinsic	value.
Another	difference	 is	 that	while	Williams	offers	a	 two-level	view	
that	 is	structurally	similar	to	indirect	utilitarianism,	the	repartition	of	
the	 justificatory weight	across	the	two	levels	of	the	utilitarian,	(1)	and	
(2),	 is	very	different	 from	its	 repartition	across	Williams’s	 two	 levels,	
(1)	and	(2′).	The	indirect	utilitarian	can	agree	that	people’s	motivations	
in	being	truthful	should	be	that	truthfulness	is	a	good	thing	in	its	own	
right,	but	what	really justifies	thinking	in	this	way	is	the	consideration,	
offered	at	the	more	reflective	second	level,	that	this	is	ultimately	more	
conducive	to	well-being.	For	Williams,	by	contrast,	the	bulk	of	the	jus-
tificatory	weight	lies	on	the	first	level:	the	fact	that	truthfulness	is	in-
trinsically	valuable	carries	more	authority	than	the	fact	that	things	go	
better	if	we	think	this	way.	The	latter	fact	yields	in	the	first	instance	an	
explanation rather	than	a	justification,	even	if	a	vindicatory	one.
The	propensity	to	conceive	of	intrinsic	and	instrumental	value	as	
mutually	exclusive	is	not	specific	to	utilitarianism.	It	also	manifests	it-
self	in	the	view	that	there	is	nothing	more	to	be	said	about	a	good	once	
we	have	recognised	its	 intrinsic	value	—	it	 is	valuable,	and	that	is	all.	
On	this	view,	an	explanation	that	exhibits	truthfulness’s	instrumental	
relations	to	other,	less	refined	values	will	appear	to	besmear	it	—	to	im-
ply	that	truthfulness	has	no	intrinsic	value	(really).	Once	again,	how-
ever,	 this	appears	so	only	 if	we	conceive	of	 the	distinction	between	
intrinsic	and	instrumental	as	an	exclusive	one:	either	we	make	sense	
of	a	value	on	its	own	terms,	which	we	treat	as	irreducible,	or	we	view	it	
purely	as	a	means	to	an	end	and	reduce	its	value	to	that	of	something	
else.29	But	this	sets	up	a	false	dichotomy.	Nothing	forces	us	to	choose,	
and	once	one	rids	oneself	of	the	exclusive	conception,	it	becomes	evi-
dent	that	myriad	things	unite	both	aspects.
29. Williams	(1997a,	24;	TT	90).
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motives	do	these	movements	of	 limbs	become	recognisable	as	prac-
tices.	And	when	these	reasons	and	motives	make	no	reference	to	the	
practice’s	 functionality,	 the	attempt	 to	explain	 the	practice	 in	purely	
functional	terms	will	appear	to	distort	the	practice,	to	mistake	it	for	a	
pastiche	version	marked	by	single-minded	 instrumentalism.	 If	 there	
is	something	functional	about	a	practice	which	is	not	understood	in	
functional	terms,	we	must	find	a	place	for	functionality	within	an	ex-
planation	which	holds	on	both	to	the	practice	and	to	the	non-function-
al	understanding	of	it.
Second,	the	state-of-nature	model	 itself	reveals	that	the	presence	
of	non-instrumental	motivations	to	be	truthful	is	one	of	the	functional 
requirements	on	the	practice	of	truthfulness,	which	means	that	the	func-
tionality	of	 truthfulness	 cannot	be	 accounted	 for	 in	purely	 function-
al	 terms.	 Instrumental	motives	 for	 being	 truthful	 cannot	 render	 the	
practice	stable	enough	to	fulfil	its	function:	the	instrumental	value	of	
accuracy,	 to	some	extent,	but	 to	a	greater	degree	that	of	sincerity,	 is	
largely	a	value	for others.	A	functionally	motivated	practice	of	truthful-
ness	would	therefore	be	overly	vulnerable	to	free	riders.	The	practice	
of	truthfulness	can	be	stable,	and	possess	instrumental	value,	only inso-
far	as	it	is	intrinsically	motivated.	It	needs	to	outgrow	its	functionality	
in	order	to	be	functional,	which	is	to	say	that	it	needs	to	be	driven	by	
non-functional	motives.	And	once	these	are	effective,	they	may	well	
possess	more	authority	 than	the	 functional	motives	 for	having	 those	
non-functional	motives.
What	Williams’s	genealogy	shows	is	that	while	truthfulness	needs	
to	be	sustained	by	non-instrumental	motives,	awareness	of	the	instru-
mental	 or	 functional	motives	 for	 engaging	 in	 truthfulness	 is	 not	 re-
quired.	No	instrumental	valuing	of	truthfulness	is	needed	to	reap	its	
instrumental	value.	(2′)	might	however	be	read	this	way,	so	to	preempt	
this	reading,	the	genealogy	is	best	represented	as	issuing	in	the	follow-
ing	two	beliefs:
dispositions	of	truthfulness	that	we	have,	or	that	anyone	else	has	had,	
can	be	adequately	explained	in	functional	terms”	(TT	34–5).	Because	
pure	functionalism	only	traces	out	instrumental	reasons	for	action,	it	
misses	both	the	fact	that	something’s	being	a	form	of	truthfulness	also	
constitutes	a	new reason for action,	and	that	this	must	be	so	if	the	prac-
tice	 is	 to	 be	 functional.	 By	 focusing	only	 on	 the	 instrumental	 value,	
an	 explanation	of	 truthfulness	 in	 purely	 functional	 terms	misses	 its	
intrinsic	value,	and	it	misses	the	functional	connection	between	the	
instrumental	and	the	 intrinsic	value.31	Moreover,	a	purely	 functional	
analysis	is	also	blind	to	whatever	non-functional	aspects	truthfulness	
has	acquired	 in	 the	course	of	 its	history.	Cultural	variation	between	
groups	and	cultures	 implies	 that	 even	 if	 certain	 functional	 relations	
were	 the	 same	across	 these	variations,	 truthfulness	would	neverthe-
less	 also	 have	 been	 shaped	by	 different	 contingencies	 in	 each	 case.	
What	truthfulness	needs	to	be	is	only	a	very	partial	guide	to	what	it	
actually	is.
Can	the	pure	 functionalist	not	shrug	 this	off	by	saying	 that	he	 is	
simply	not	interested	in	these	non-functional	aspects?	I	think	not,	be-
cause	I	take	Williams’s	claim	to	be	that	the	non-functional	aspects	of	
the	practice	 are	 essential	 both	 to	 its	 individuation	 and	 to	 an	under-
standing	of	its	functionality.
First,	the	non-functional	aspects	of	a	practice	can	be	completely	ig-
nored	only	at	the	cost	of	treating	the	participants’	understanding	of	the	
practice	as	external	to	it,	as	a	mere	epiphenomenon.	But,	for	Williams,	
we	cannot	treat	the	understanding	of	the	practice	as	epiphenomenal	
while	retaining	the	practice	as	an	object	of	investigation,	because	that	
understanding	is	integrally related	to	the	practice	itself.32	If	we	tried	to	
pick	out	the	practice	without	covertly	having	recourse	to	its	interpre-
tation	by	 the	practitioners,	all	we	would	be	 left	with	are	sets	of	mo-
tions	whose	classification	into	distinguishable	practices	would	seem	
arbitrary.	Only	when	interpreted	as	expressions	of	certain	reasons	and	
31. This	is	illuminatingly	brought	out	by	Craig	(2007,	200).
32. See	Moran	(2016,	322–4).
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has	 in	 fact	outgrown	the	purely	 instrumental	prototype.	We	can	call	
this	the	phenomenon	of	self-effacing functionality:
Self-Effacing Functionality:
The	 practice	 is	 functional,	 but	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 sus-
tained	by	motives	that	are	autonomous,	i.e.	not	condition-
al	on	 the	practice’s	 functionality	 in	any	given	case.	The	
practice	must	outrun	its	functionality	in	order	to	be	func-
tional.	When	this	condition	is	met,	the	functionality	of	the	
practice	will	be	either	secondary	or	entirely	absent	from	
the	participants’	minds	as	they	engage	in	it,	but	 for func-
tional reasons.	In	this	sense,	the	functionality	is	self-effacing.
More	precisely,	a	practice	is	self-effacingly	functional	only	if	it	meets	
the	following	conditions:
(a)	Functionality:	the	practice	is	functional,	i.e.	it	makes	a	
useful	difference	to	the	lives	of	those	who	engage	in	it;
(b)	Autonomy:	 the	 practice	 is	 sustained	 by	motives	 that	
are	not	conditional	on	its	functionality	in	any	given	case;
(c)	Dependence: the	practice	can	be	functional	only insofar 
as	it	satisfies	(b),	i.e.	it	would	be	unstable,	redundant,	or	
otherwise	ineffective	if	sustained	merely	by	motives	con-
ditional	on	functionality	in	any	given	case;	and
(d)	Explanatory Connection:	the	practice	fulfils	(b)	because 
of	(c),	i.e.	there	is	an	explanatory	connection	between	its	
autonomy	and	its	dependence	on	autonomy.
We	 can	 call	 this	 the	 FADE	 structure:	 Functionality,	 Autonomy,	 De-
pendence,	 and	 an	 Explanatory	 connection	 between	 the	 latter	 two.	
Functionality	will	indeed	fade	from	view	in	a	practice	which	exhibits	
this	structure,	overshadowed	or	completely	eclipsed	by	autonomous	
(1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable.
(2′′)	The	attitude	expressed	in	(1)	is	instrumentally	related	
to	certain	human	needs	if	widely	shared	and	known	to	be	
shared.
It	is	only	the fact that	we	value	truthfulness	intrinsically	which	is	shown	
to	have	instrumental	value,	even	if	we	never	value	truthfulness	instru-
mentally.	The	genealogy	relates	“a	value	which	gives	us	some	reasons	
for	 action	 to	 other	 reasons	 for	 action	which	 […]	we	 have	 ‘anyway’”	
(Williams	2000,	160)	—	but	while	the	relation	between	them	is	an	in-
strumental	 relation,	 the	 reasons	 for	 action	 are	 not	 instrumental	 rea-
sons.	It	is	by	being	“bloody-minded	rather	than	benefit-minded”	(TT 
59)	 that	we	 reap	 the	benefits,	and	 the	genealogy	helps	explain	why	
this	must	be	so.
This	puts	even	more	distance	between	Williams’s	genealogy	and	
the	problem	of	 reflective	 instability.	The	genealogical	 account	finds	
in	 truthfulness	an	 instrumental	value	which	derives	 solely	 from	 the	
intrinsic	valuing	of	it.	Functionality	is	not	part	of	the	content	of	the	mo-
tives,	but	is	possessed	by	them.33	Functionality	helps	explain	why	we	
value	what	we	value,	but	it	is	what	we	value	which	motivates	and	justi-
fies	what	we	do.	
This	 is	why	we	 should	opt	 for	 genealogy	 in	 the	 form	of	 (ii),	 the	
application	of	the	purely	functional	apparatus	to	an	abstract	model	of	
truthfulness,	if	we	are	neither	to	overemphasise	nor	to	overlook	func-
tionality.	 State-of-nature	 genealogy	 is	 called	 for	 when	 dealing	 with	
a	practice	that	needs	to	outgrow	its	own	functionality	in	order	to	be	
functional,	i.e.	that	needs	to	be	sustained	by	motives	that	do	not	refer	
to	its	functionality.	Applying	the	purely	functional	apparatus	to	a	pro-
totypical	version	of	the	practice	and	seeing	its	inability	to	account	for	
the	practice’s	functionality	enables	us	to	understand	why	the	practice	
33. Craig’s	 reading	 of	Williams,	 by	 contrast,	 seems	 to	 retain	 the	 idea	 of	 “func-
tional	motivations”	(2007,	200).
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uses	without	the	insight	into	the	use	leading	us	to	lose	our	grip	on	the	
intrinsic	value	(TT	93).
What	about	(iii),	the	part	of	the	genealogy	which	involves	itself	in	
history?	On	 the	 interpretation	offered	here,	 it	 is	 required	because	a 
priori reflection	can	take	us	only	so	far:	from	highly	general	demands	
on	human	beings	 to	a	 schematic	understanding	of	what	 is	 required	
to	meet	these	demands;	but	to	cover	the	remaining	distance	between	
what	should	be	the	case	and	what	is	actually	the	case,	we	need	to	take	
more	 socio-historically	 local	 developments	 into	 account.	While	 the	
model	shows	that	truthfulness	needs	to	be	valued	intrinsically,	it	can-
not	help	us	specify	the	material	needed	to	do	so.	History	is	required	
to	understand	the	ideas	in	terms	of	which	we	came	to	make	sense	of	
truthfulness.	Moreover,	 these	 ideas	 are	 the	 products	 of	 various	 his-
torical	forces,	and	their	contingent	historical	extensions	and	elabora-
tions	cannot	be	anticipated	a priori.	Generic	needs	cannot	account	for	
the	extension	of	 truthfulness	 to	 the	distant	past	 around	 the	 time	of	
Thucydides	(TT	ch.	7),	or	for	the	fashioning	of	Sincerity	into	the	ideal	
of	personal	authenticity	in	the	course	of	the	Romantic	era	(TT	ch.	8).	
Here	we	need	to	draw	on	a	historical	understanding	of	the	more	local 
needs	 that	 came	 to	bear	on	 truthfulness.	This	 is	 the	point	 at	which	
“philosophy,	in	order	to	do	its	business,	must	move	into	history”	(TT 
173).	This	is	not	to	say	that	genealogy	becomes “history,	correctly	prac-
ticed”	(Nehamas	1985,	246n1).34	Williams	denies	that	what	he	is	offer-
ing	is	anything	like	the	historian’s	craft;	he	wants	only	to	“mention	a	
few	of	 the	historical	divergences”	and	to	“trace	some	features	of	 the	
structure	that	give	rise	to	the	variations”	(TT	95)	of	the	prototype	of	
truthfulness	outlined	in	the	State	of	Nature.	Finally,	the	state-of-nature	
story	gives	us	only	a	prima facie	reason	to	continue	to	value	truthfulness	
intrinsically.	 Certain	 incentive	 structures	—	for	 instance,	 in	 a	 society	
systematically	 rewarding	 truthfulness	with	material	benefits	—	could	
34. This	understanding	of	genealogy	as	a	species	of	history	is	endorsed	by	Ge-
uss	(1999,	22–3),	Owen	(2007,	143),	Merrick	(2009),	and	Migotti	(2016).	See	
Queloz	(2017a)	for	a	more	general	discussion	of	what,	on	Williams’s	account,	
engaging	with	history	can	do	for	us.
motives	 carrying	 more	 authority	 than	 instrumental	 considerations.	
The	FADE	structure	helps	explain	why	this	state	of	affairs	is	not	just	a	
matter	of	historical	accident,	but	grounded	in	solid	functional	reasons.
The	FADE	structure	is	not	the	same	as	the	structure	familiar	from	
Critical	Theory,	where	awareness	of	a	practice’s	 functionality	 is	 radi-
cally	 incompatible	with	 full-blooded	 engagement	 in	 it.	With	 self-ef-
facingly	functional	practices,	the	point	is	only	that	the	functionality	of	
the	practice	is	not	in	itself	enough	to	sustain	it,	and	so	it	is	a	functional	
requirement	on	the	practice	that	 there	be	non-instrumental	motives	
for	 engaging	 in	 it.	This	need	not	mean	 that	becoming	aware	of	 the	
instrumental	motives	for	engaging	in	the	practice	has	a	destabilising	
effect,	 as	Williams’s	 own	 example	 of	 truthfulness	 shows.	 Note	 also	
that	we	are	only	dealing	with	self-effacing functionality	when	the	func-
tionality	of	the	practice	depends	on	there	being	non-functional	motives,	
and	when	there	is	an	explanatory connection	between	this	fact	and	the	
non-functional	motives	sustaining	 it.	This	distinguishes	self-effacing	
functionality	 from	practices	which	 fulfil	 conditions	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 only	
because	the	participants	fail	to	realise	the	practice’s	functionality	and	
engage	 in	 it	 because	 they	 have	 been	 taught	 to	 do	 so.	 It	 also	 distin-
guishes	 it	 from	practices	which	 fulfil	 conditions	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 and	do	
so	 for	 functional	 reasons,	 but	which	 are	 in	 principle	 sustainable	 by	
instrumental	motives	alone:	we	eat	sweet	fruit	not	just	because	doing	
so	serves	some	further	end,	such	as	our	health,	but	because	we	like	to	
eat	sweet	fruit;	this	intrinsic	liking	for	sweet	fruit	might	well	turn	out	
to	have	functional	origins;	but	if	we	suddenly	ceased	to	like	sweet	fruit,	
the	practice	would	not	necessarily	break	down;	it	could	be	sustained	
by	instrumental	concerns	alone.	Hence,	the	functionality	of	the	prac-
tice	is	not	truly	self-effacing,	but	only	contingently	effaced.	In	sum:	a	
practice	 is	 self-effacingly	 functional	 if	 it	 is	 functional	but	we	do	not	
do	it	for	its	functionality,	and	it	is	functional	only	because	we	do	not	
do	it	for	its	functionality.	As	Thomas	Nagel	notes,	this	is	“a	common	
feature	of	ethical	norms,	from	promise-keeping	to	property	rights	to	
the	rule	of	law”	(2009,	132).	Genealogy	is	uniquely	suited	to	describ-
ing	self-effacing	functionality.	It	shows	that	intrinsic	values	have	their	
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which	allow	us	to	answer	distinctively	philosophical	concerns	about	
truthfulness:	What	 is	 the	 point	 of	 truthfulness?	 How	 does	 it	 relate	
to	 the	 rest	of	human	psychology?	What	other	 ideas	and	values	 is	 it	
tied	up	with?	And	once	all	this	becomes	transparent	to	us,	should	we	
continue	to	cultivate	it?	These	are	the	questions	to	which	Williams’s	
genealogy	forms	the	answer.	The	questions,	in	that	combination,	are	
clearly	 those	of	philosophy	before	 they	are	 those	of	any	other	disci-
pline;	and	as	Williams	learned	from	Collingwood,	our	understanding	
of	the	questions	should	guide	our	understanding	of	the	answers.36
Conclusion: The Wider Significance of Williams’s Genealogy
Williams’s	 genealogy	 can	 thus	 be	 defended	 against	 McGinn’s	 chal-
lenges	on	all	fronts.	It	vindicates	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value	and,	
in	the	process,	makes	clear	what	this	means;	it	is	not	a	form	of	indirect	
utilitarianism,	but	differs	from	it	in	just	the	way	required	to	avoid	the	
problem	of	instability	under	reflection;	and	its	functionalist	elements	
do	not	render	 the	genealogical	elements	redundant,	but	rather	com-
bine	with	 them	 to	make	 sense	of	why	 truthfulness	must	outgrow	a	
state	of	mere	functionality.	By	way	of	conclusion,	I	would	like	to	con-
sider	the	wider	significance	of	this	genealogy	in	the	light	of	Williams’s	
conception	of	what	philosophy	should	aim	for.
The	“principal	aim	of	all	moral	philosophy”,	Williams	maintains,	is	
that	“of	truthfully	understanding	what	our	ethical	values	are	and	how	
they	are	related	to	our	psychology,	and	making,	in	the	light	of	that	un-
derstanding,	a	valuation	of	those	values”	(1995a,	581).	We	can	now	see	
that	Williams’s	genealogical	method	is	directly	subservient	to	this	aim.	
It	helps	us	make	sense	of	our	values	as	responses	to	more	basic	human	
needs;	and	it	facilitates	a	valuation	of	them	by	helping	us	determine	
the	extent	to	which	they	have	helped	us	to	live.	This	is	not	the	sort	of	
valuation	which	yields	ethical	truths	directly	—	it	does	not,	for	instance,	
tell	us	whether	to	be	truthful	in	a	given	situation.	The	general	insights	
it	yields	are	that	certain	basic	features	of	human	psychology	demand	
36. Williams	(2006b,	ch.	24).
in	 principle	 discharge	 the	 function	 performed	 by	 the	 intrinsic	 valu-
ing.35	Historical	developments	can	both	add	to	and	subtract	from	our	
reasons	to	value	truthfulness,	both	generically	and	in	specific	areas.
Williams	acknowledges	this	when	he	writes	that	there	is	no	one	rea-
son	to	value	truthfulness	(TT	263–5),	and	his	genealogy’s	involvement	
in	history	serves	to	do	justice	to	this	idea.	The	state-of-nature	consider-
ations	indicate	one	widely	shared	instrumental	reason	to	value	truth-
fulness	intrinsically,	but	the	later	parts	of	the	book	point	to	other	rea-
sons,	more	closely	tied	up	with	our	history	and	our	own	ideals,	such	
as	the	ideals	of	liberalism.	While	the	instrumental	reasons	laid	out	in	
the	State	of	Nature	do	not	give	us	a	reason	to	prefer	truthfulness	about	
the	distant	past	over	myth,	 for	example,	 liberalism	does.	Liberalism,	
on	Williams’s	view,	both	enables	and	encourages	truthful	history;	but	
it	also	specially	needs	it.	This	may	seem	like	a	joke,	given	that	truthful	
history	 tends	 to	soak	 in	suspicion	 large	parts	of	 the	progressive	nar-
ratives	liberalism	tells	about	itself.	But,	for	Williams,	liberalism	is	ulti-
mately	kept	afloat	by	the	liberalism	of	fear,	and	the	fear	in	question	is	
fuelled	by	historical	consciousness	of	past	atrocities.	It	is	in	this	sense	
that	liberals	have	a	special	reason	to	prefer	truthful	history	over	myth. 
We	should	be	wary	of	reading	Williams’s	genealogy	as	superimpos-
ing,	 in	 the	 form	of	(ii)	and	(iii),	 the	products	of	different	disciplines,	
such	as	game	theory	and	historiography.	This	would	rightly	invite	con-
cerns	—	voiced	by	Rorty	 (2002)	 and	echoed	by	Koopman	 (2013,	 70–
1)	—	about	how	such	disparate	elements	could	coherently	be	stitched	
together.	We	should	see	pragmatic	genealogy	instead	as	an	exercise	
in	philosophical	model-building	which,	while	informed	by	other	dis-
ciplines,	responds	to	concerns	that	are	recognisably	those	of	philoso-
phy.	A	pragmatic	genealogy	is	a	dynamic	model	starting	out	from	an	
abstract	representation	of	a	basic	predicament	which	is	then	gradually	
de-idealised	in	the	direction	of	our	actual	situation	by	tracing	out	how	
it	might	develop	in	response	to	generic	and	local	needs.	The	purpose	of	
such	a	genealogy	is	to	render	perspicuous	those	formative	influences	
35. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	me	on	this	point.
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genealogical	 reflection,	 giving	 it	 a	 bill	 of	 health.	 Yet	 it	 derives	 addi-
tional	significance	from	two	further	facts.
One	is	 that	truthfulness	 is	a	thick concept	—	a	concept	that	 is	both	
world-guided	and	action-guiding.	Thick	concepts	offer	both	more	and	
less	 stability	 than	 thin	 ones	 like	 good	 and	 right.	 They	 offer	more	 sta-
bility	 insofar	as	 they	help	stabilise	 the	practice	 they	are	 involved	 in	
by	rendering	judgements	straightforwardly	true	(2011,	222).	Yet	thick	
concepts	also	offer	less	stability	insofar	as	they	are	particularly	liable	
to	 be	 unseated	 by	 reflection.	 Reflecting	 on	 a	 thick	 concept,	we	 are	
more	likely	to	find	considerations	that	lead	us	to	cease	to	live	by	that	
concept	 (1995c,	 207).	 Truthfulness’s	 being	 stable	 under	 reflection	 is	
therefore	specially	significant	in	showing	that	there	are	thick	concepts	
capable	of	surviving	reflective	scrutiny.	This	invites	us	to	identify	more	
such	concepts	through	further	genealogical	inquiry.	
Finally,	 the	other	 fact	 from	which	a	genealogy	that	takes	truthful-
ness	as	its	object	derives	special	significance	is	that	truthfulness	is	a	
driving	force	of	genealogical	reflection	itself.	In	exhibiting	truthfulness	
as	stable	under	such	reflection,	Williams	demonstrates	that	genealogi-
cal	reflection	will	not	peck	into	the	dust	the	tree	that	supports	it.	This	
is	a	markedly	different	result	from	that	of	his	great	predecessor	as	a	
genealogist	of	 truthfulness,	Nietzsche.	Nietzsche	denounced	 the	un-
conditional	will	to	truth	fostered	by	Protestant	Christianity	as	doomed	
to	erode	its	own	basis.37 Truth and Truthfulness,	by	contrast,	shows	us	
that	the	roots	of	our	sense	of	the	value	of	truth	reach	far	deeper.	While	
the	application	of	the	virtues	of	truth	to	various	areas	depends	on	con-
tinual	cultivation,	 these	virtues	are	also	firmly	anchored	in	basic	hu-
man	needs	—	they	derive	their	point	from	the	need	to	gain	and	share	
information.	The	upshot	is	a	combination	of	encouragement	and	ad-
monition;	encouragement	because	it	suggests	that	truthfulness	is	ca-
pable	of	withstanding	its	own	scrutiny,	and	thus	of	providing	a	stable	
basis	 from	which	 to	 engage	 in	 genealogical	 reflection	more	widely;	
37. Nietzsche	(1998,	III,	§27).	But	even	Nietzsche	does	not	think	we	should	give	
up	 on	 truthfulness	 altogether.	 See	 Queloz	 (2017b,	 manuscript)	 for	 discus-
sions	of	the	continuities	between	Nietzsche’s	views	and	Williams’s.
that	certain	dispositions	or	concepts	be	present	in	society	in	some	form,	
while	leaving	it	open	which	form	this	should	be.	This	does	not	mean	
that	one	can	then	reason	one’s	way	from	the	insights	into	the	practical	
necessity	of	having	 those	dispositions	 to	 the	beliefs	 involved	 in hav-
ing	 those	dispositions.	The	beliefs	 involved	 in	having	 these	disposi-
tions	are	not	typically	beliefs	about	dispositions,	but	about	the	social	
world.	Yet	such	a	genealogy	can	show	us	that	there	is	good	reason	for	
us	 to	 live	a	 life	 that	 involves	certain	conceptual	and	evaluative	prac-
tices.	It	does	not	demonstrate	the	truth	of	statements	made	using	these	
concepts;	 it	only	vindicates	 the	disposition to accept	 these	statements.	
Moreover,	the	vindication	it	offers	is	addressed	only	to	those	already	
disposed	to	treat	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value,	who	already	pos-
sess	the	material	necessary	to	making	sense	of	it	as	such.	Genealogy	
does	not	convert	shirkers,	but	it	can	strengthen	wavering	confidence.
The	 importance	of	strengthening	our	confidence	 in	our	concepts	
and	values	emerges	when	we	consider	together	two	of	Williams’s	cen-
tral	 convictions:	 that	we	should	aim	 for	 truthful	 self-understanding;	
but	that	our	ideas	are	unlikely	always	to	survive	truthful	scrutiny.	Wil-
liams	holds	that	ethical	thought,	in	particular,	“should	stand	up	to	re-
flection”	 and	 “its	 institutions	 and	practices	 should	be	 capable	of	 be-
coming	transparent”	(2011,	222);	yet	he	is	also	inclined	to	agree	with	
Nietzsche’s	diagnosis	of	the	condition	of	modernity	as	“one	in	which	
we,	 at	 once,	 have	 a	 morality	 which	 is	 seriously	 unstable	 under	 ge-
nealogical	explanation;	are	committed	(by	that	very	morality,	among	
other	things)	to	transparency;	and	find	very	little	to	hand	in	the	way	of	
an	alternative”	(2000,	160).	As	Williams	had	already	put	it	nearly	two	
decades	earlier,	in	response	to	the	assumption	of	much	ethical	theory	
that	we	have	too	many	ethical	ideas:	“Our	major	problem	now	is	actu-
ally	that	we	have	not	too	many	but	too	few,	and	we	need	to	cherish	as	
many	as	we	can”	(2011,	130).
Part	of	the	wider	significance	of	Williams’s	vindicatory	genealogy	
of	truthfulness	thus	derives	from	the	contribution	it	makes	to	the	cher-
ishing	of	our	ethical	ideas:	it	shows	one	such	idea	to	be	stable	under	
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